Russia’s expanding role in Africa’s food security

By Kestér Kenn KLOMEGÂH

As global geopolitical dynamics shift, Africa continues to recalibrate its economic partnerships, particularly with Russia. Following two high-profile Russia–Africa summits, cooperation in the area of food security emerged as a key theme.

Moscow pledged to boost agricultural exports to the continent—especially grain, poultry, and fertilisers—while African leaders welcomed the prospect of improved food supplies.

Yet, despite the warm rhetoric and symbolic gestures, this cooperation raises deeper concerns. Africa’s continued reliance on food imports—particularly from Russia—risks reinforcing structural dependence at a time when many nations are trying to prioritise agricultural self-sufficiency.

By 2026, some of Russia’s earlier food security pledges may quietly recede as Africa increasingly adopts import substitution policies and intensifies domestic production. The path forward lies in rethinking the Russia–Africa agricultural dynamic—shifting from dependency toward resilient, locally driven food systems.

Tanzania as a Russian Gateway—and a Test Case

At a May 2025 meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation in St. Petersburg, Russia’s Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov highlighted Tanzania as a strategic entry point for Russian exports into East Africa.

Co-chairing the meeting with Tanzania’s Planning and Investment Minister Kitila Mkumbo, Reshetnikov revealed that more than 40 Russian companies were keen to export animal products and agricultural goods to the region.

Tanzania’s geographic position makes it an ideal logistics hub—but also a cautionary tale. Despite its vast arable land and agriculture-based economy, Tanzania continues to allocate a significant portion of its national budget to food imports that could be locally produced. This contradiction—between potential and policy—is emblematic of broader African trends.

Russia, eager to expand its economic footprint, sees agricultural exports as a key revenue generator. Estimates suggest the Russian government could earn over US$15 billion from exports to East Africa alone.

Russia’s Growing Role in Grain and Fertiliser

According to Interfax News Agency and the Russian Union of Grain Exporters, Moscow has aggressively ramped up grain shipments to Africa. At the 4th Russian Grain Forum in Sochi, the Union’s chairman, Dmitry Sergeyev, identified 25 target African countries for Russian grain exports this season. Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Tanzania, and Sudan are among the top destinations.

Russia now supplies roughly one-third of Africa’s wheat imports and has significantly increased deliveries to Algeria, Libya, Kenya, and Morocco. First-time shipments have also reached Djibouti, Gambia, the Central African Republic, and Eritrea. While this positions Russia as a reliable food source, it also raises alarm bells about Africa’s vulnerability to external supply chains.

Sergeyev acknowledged the infrastructural hurdles in Central and Southern Africa, where poor logistics require working through international traders. For deeper market penetration, Russia plans to invest in storage, transport, and processing infrastructure.

Still, these are business ventures aimed at Russian revenue, not necessarily African resilience. African countries, with vast land and labour, could—and should—build their own systems of production, processing, and storage. Yet many governments continue to prioritise food imports over investing in their own farming sectors.

Fertiliser Diplomacy: Strategic, but Not Without Flaws

Fertiliser is another critical front. Russian agro-industrial giant PhosAgro has emerged as a leading supplier of phosphate-based fertilisers to Africa. In 2024 alone, it exported 8.6 million tonnes of fertilisers—double the volume from a decade ago—and now supplies 21 African nations, including South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Mozambique.

PhosAgro aims to double its deliveries to Africa within five years. The company markets its products as solutions tailored to the needs of African soil and farmers. However, agronomy experts argue that many Russian fertilisers are ill-suited to African soil types, potentially degrading long-term productivity.

More pressing is the cost: logistical expenses are exorbitant, often inflating the final price of Russian fertilisers beyond what many small-scale African farmers can afford. In this light, Africa’s over-reliance on imported agrochemicals undermines not only sustainability but affordability and food sovereignty.

This is where import substitution becomes critical. Boosting local fertiliser production can reduce foreign currency expenditures, create jobs, and provide better-adapted agro-solutions. Fertiliser self-sufficiency would mark a key milestone in Africa’s path to economic and ecological sovereignty.

The Dependency Dilemma—and the Case for African Production

Despite the surge in trade, Russian media and policy analysts have raised concerns about growing African dependence on imports. Moscow may tout its “soft power” success in feeding Africa, but many experts—on both continents—urge a pivot toward strengthening African agriculture from within.

This debate played out prominently during the 2023 and 2025 Russia–Africa summits, where policymakers called for a move away from symbolic agreements and toward practical support for African agricultural development. The message: Africa cannot afford to sacrifice food sovereignty for geopolitical solidarity.

Local producers across the continent have voiced frustration over the lack of government support. National budgets are disproportionately directed toward food and fertiliser imports rather than building irrigation systems, subsidising smallholders, or providing access to rural credit. In effect, many African governments are entrenching dependency rather than empowering their agricultural base.

Dangote’s Vision: African Solutions to African Problems

Entrepreneur Aliko Dangote has emerged as a powerful advocate for agricultural self-reliance. Speaking at the 32nd Afreximbank Annual Meeting, Dangote argued that Africa could become a “Heaven” within five years—if it embraced bold, forward-thinking policies. His call: prioritise local production, reject foreign dependency, and build regional supply chains.

Dangote’s US$20 billion refinery in Lagos, the largest single-train facility in the world, is already transforming Africa’s energy map and challenging Europe’s fuel export dominance. Now, Dangote is turning his focus to fertilisers.

In Nigeria, the Dangote Fertiliser complex—Africa’s largest granulated urea facility—has dramatically reduced reliance on imports. Plans are underway to replicate this success in Eastern Africa, with a US$3 billion investment to stabilise fertiliser supply in Ethiopia and neighbouring countries. Located along the Ethiopia–Djibouti logistics corridor, the facility is expected to bolster regional agricultural productivity, reduce costs, and stimulate job creation.

The Dangote model, combining large-scale infrastructure with regional market integration, could serve as a blueprint for African industrialisation in agriculture and beyond.

Angola’s Turn: Afreximbank and the Fertiliser Future

In Angola, a similar story is unfolding. Afreximbank is financing a transformative US$2 billion fertiliser plant in Soyo, spearheaded by the OPAIA Group in partnership with international engineering firms. The Amufert S.A. complex will produce 4,000 metric tons of urea and ammonia daily—reducing Angola’s fertiliser imports, creating over 4,700 jobs, and supporting food sovereignty.

Beyond meeting national demand, the plant will supply surplus fertiliser to neighbouring countries, fostering intra-African trade and regional integration. By leveraging its natural gas reserves, Angola also moves closer to economic diversification, reducing its traditional reliance on oil exports.

The project highlights a fundamental shift: African countries increasingly understand that food security is inseparable from local production and industrial capacity. With proper investment and governance, they can transition from importers to exporters—and from dependency to autonomy.

Currency Politics, Geopolitics—and the Dollar Dilemma

Alongside trade, Russia is also promoting the use of local currencies in Africa–Russia transactions. This is part of Moscow’s broader strategy to challenge Western hegemony and reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. While symbolically significant, such a shift offers limited practical benefits unless paired with structural economic reforms.

Africa still remains heavily dependent on dollar-linked financial flows. In 2024 alone, remittances from the United States to Africa totalled US$58 billion. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a U.S. trade preference programme, is also set for renegotiation, underscoring Washington’s continued influence on the continent’s trade framework.

While geopolitical diversification is welcome, it must not distract from the real task at hand: strengthening domestic production capacities, building resilient institutions, and investing in people.

Policy Imperatives: Import Substitution, Sustainability, and Jobs

A recurring theme across expert forums, bank meetings, and agricultural conferences is clear: African governments must stop importing what they can grow and produce locally. Redirecting national budgets toward supporting farmers, investing in agro-industrial infrastructure, and fostering innovation in the sector is no longer optional—it is essential.

Institutions such as the African Export–Import Bank and the African Development Bank have issued strong recommendations to this effect. In recent years, both banks have increased financing for agricultural transformation projects, ranging from fertiliser plants to logistics upgrades and irrigation systems. They’ve also urged shareholders to prioritise food production and accelerate intra-African trade in agricultural goods.

These efforts are timely, given the climate-related shocks, global fertiliser shortages, and political unrest that continue to destabilise food systems across the continent. Building internal capacity is the surest path to resilience.

Looking Ahead: Toward a Sovereign Agricultural Future

Russia’s efforts to expand food and fertiliser exports to Africa reflect a calculated economic and geopolitical strategy. While short-term benefits exist—stabilising food supply, opening markets, and diversifying partnerships—the long-term consequences of over-reliance are deeply concerning.

Africa must resist the temptation of quick fixes and recommit to building robust domestic agriculture. This includes scaling up agro-industrial ventures like those led by Dangote, expanding public–private partnerships, and enhancing regional food trade. The path to sovereignty is not paved with wheat imports but with bold investment in homegrown solutions.

In this changing era, food security is no longer merely a development issue—it is a cornerstone of national security, economic independence, and global standing. For Africa, the time to act is now.

Kestér Kenn KLOMEGÂH is an experienced policy researcher and business consultant. His work focuses on geopolitical dynamics, foreign policy, and economic development in Africa’s relations with major global powers. [This article was originally published by WorldView]

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