Structural divergence after independence

By Ben BRAKO (koBENa) BRAKO

At independence, Ghana, Singapore, South Korea, and Indonesia stood at broadly comparable developmental thresholds. None were rich. None were fully industrialized. All faced post-war or post-colonial disruption. Yet within two generations, the Asian states achieved structural transformation, while Ghana remained locked into commodity dependence.

This divergence cannot be explained by intelligence, effort, or leadership morality. It must be explained by civilizational alignment—specifically, whether the post-colonial state functioned as Oman (a coordinating, socially embedded steward of collective wellbeing) or Aban (a garrison-style extractor oriented toward control, revenue, and external validation).

The argument advanced here is that Ghana inherited—and largely retained—Aban logic, while East Asian states, despite authoritarianism, evolved Oman-like functionality in their economic governance.

Colonial Infrastructure: Aban Imprinted in Steel and Rail

Colonial infrastructure in Ghana was not neutral. It was Aban made concrete.

Railways and ports were designed to:

• extract cocoa, gold, and timber,
• bypass internal market integration,
• serve external metropoles, not domestic circulation.

This infrastructural logic survived independence intact. The post-colonial state administered extraction more than it reorganized production.

East Asian states inherited less extractive infrastructure and deliberately re-coded their states toward Oman-like coordination:

• industrial zones,
• logistics clustering,
• domestic market consolidation.

Where Ghana’s state managed flows outward, Asian states organized flows inward and upward.

Resource Abundance and the Aban Incentive Trap

Ghana’s resource wealth enabled fiscal survival without productive transformation. This shifted the state’s center of gravity away from stewardship (Oman) toward rent administration (Aban).

In Aban logic:

• control matters more than production,
• rents substitute for legitimacy,
• volatility is transferred downward.

In Oman logic:

• productivity legitimizes authority,
• surplus is reinvested in collective capacity,
• long-term resilience matters more than short-term extraction.

East Asian states, lacking rents, were forced into Oman behavior. Ghana was not.

Political Discontinuity: When Aban eats developmental time

Nkrumah’s industrial program—despite its flaws—was an attempt to reorient the state toward Oman: coordination, production, and long-term planning.

The 1966 coup marked not just regime change, but the reassertion of Aban:

• policy resets,
• asset abandonment,
• institutional amnesia.

Development requires time continuity. Aban regimes reset time; Oman accumulates it.

East Asian states preserved developmental continuity even under authoritarianism. Ghana repeatedly lost it.

Education Without an Oman Economy

Ghana produced skilled citizens for an economy that did not exist. Education became export-oriented.

This is classic Aban dysfunction:

• human capital treated as a commodity,
• not embedded in domestic production systems.

East Asia linked education tightly to industrial absorption. Skills followed factories; factories did not wait for abstract credentials.

Structural Adjustment: Aban reinforced from outside

Structural adjustment programs did not create Ghana’s Aban logic; they reinforced it.

• coordination was dismantled,
• industrial policy delegitimized,
• extraction normalized.

Asia avoided this fate because Cold War geopolitics allowed failure, protection, and learning. Ghana was disciplined before it had learned.

This was not economics. It was power.

Market Fragmentation: The Scale Penalty

Africa’s fragmented markets punished Oman behavior and rewarded Aban extraction.

Without regional scale:

• manufacturing could not compete,
• firms could not learn,
• productivity stagnated.

East Asia solved scale through regional integration. Africa delayed it.

Dumping and deindustrialization

Dumping did not merely harm Ghanaian industry; it signaled to the state that extraction was safer than production.

Aban logic prevailed again:

• import finished goods,
• export raw materials,
• manage the gap with debt.

Conclusion: Development as a Choice of State Logic

Ghana did not stagnate because it lacked ideas or talent. It stagnated because Aban remained dominant—internally and externally reinforced.

East Asian success is best understood not as cultural superiority, but as the gradual construction of Oman-like developmental states: coordinating, patient, embedded, and allowed to fail safely.

The task ahead is not imitation, but civilizational realignment.

Comparative Data Appendix

(Indicative, policy-facing, conservative estimates)

A1. Real GDP per Capita (2010 USD)

Country	1960	1980	2000	2024
Ghana	~1,100	~890	~1,020	~2,170
Singapore	~3,600	~14,000	~34,900	~67,700
South Korea	~1,600	~4,800	~20,000	~35,000
Indonesia	~900	~1,600	~3,000	~5,000

Interpretation:
Ghana’s growth is linear; Asia’s is compounding.

A2. Manufacturing Value Added (% of GDP)

Period	Ghana	Singapore	South Korea
1970s	~12%	~20%	~25%
1990s	~9%	~27%	~30%
2020s	~7%	~21%	~28%

Interpretation:
Ghana deindustrialized before industrial maturity.

A3. Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP, long-run average)

Country	Avg. 1970–2020
Ghana	~18–20%
Singapore	~35–45%
South Korea	~30–35%

Interpretation:
Asia sustained investment deep enough for learning and scale.

A4. Policy Continuity Index (Qualitative)

Factor	Ghana	East Asia
Regime continuity	Low	Medium–High
Industrial policy duration	Short-lived	Decades
Coup interruptions	Frequent	Rare
External policy discipline	High	Low

 

A5. Summary Table: Oman vs Aban Outcomes

Dimension	Oman Logic	Aban Logic
State role	Coordinator	Extractor
Time horizon	Long-term	Short-term
Legitimacy source	Productivity & wellbeing	Control & rents
Education	Absorption-led	Export-led
Trade posture	Strategic	Passive

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